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LOCAL POLITICS AND VIOLENT CRIME IN U.S. CITIES 
Recent research has begun to examine the effects of politics on crime.  However, few studies 
have considered how local political variation is likely to affect crime.  Using insights from urban 
politics research, this paper develops and tests hypotheses regarding direct and conditional effects of 
local politics on violent crime in 958 cities in 1991.  Results from negative binomial regression analyses 
show that violent crime rates vary by local political structures and the race of the mayor.  In addition, 
the effects of structural factors such as poverty, unemployment, and female- headed households on 
violent crime depend on local form of government and the number of unreformed local governmental 
structures.  Implications for systemic social disorganization and institutional anomie theories are 
discussed. 
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For most of the 20th century, criminological studies paid little attention to politics.  For 
instance, Bursik (1988) notes that classical social disorganization theory focuses nearly exclusively on 
internal community dynamics.  Shaw and McKay (1972) assumed that the ecological factors affecting 
community development and social mobility patterns were natural processes (Bursik and Grasmick, 
1993).  Therefore, the context surrounding a community, such as the political environment, had little to 
do with community organization.  Bursik (1988, 1989) argues that this is a significant shortcoming, 
because local governmental decisions can greatly affect community development patterns and 
ultimately crime.  Similarly, Bursik and Grasmick (1993:53-55) suggest that governmental decisions 
regarding zoning and land-use are likely to have important consequences for residential stability and 
property values.  Likewise, classical anomie theory focuses little attention on politics.  However a 
recent reformulation of anomie theory—institutional anomie theory— suggests that the impact of the 
economy on crime depends on the relative strengths of economic and non-economic institutions such as 
the polity (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997a, 1997b).  Cross-national (Savolainen, 2000) and state- level 
research (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995) testing institutional anomie theory suggests that politics can 
have direct and conditional effects on crime.  In addition, other recent research suggests that aspects of 
local politics such as the race of the mayor can have direct effects on interracial homicide (Jacobs and 
Wood, 1999), police killings of minorities (Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998) and violence against police 
(Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002). 
Because recent criminological research has begun to suggest that politics and crime are related, 
I argue that a fuller consideration of the implications of variation in local politics is in order.  To date 
few criminological studies have considered the patterned ways that local political variation could affect 
crime or included direct measures of local politics.  A voluminous body of urban politics research 
(summarized below) suggests that variation in local politics can have consequences for a number of 
social and political outcomes such as city council representation, voter turnout, and the responsiveness 
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of city government to local concerns, which I argue are likely to affect crime rates.  In the next 
section, I briefly discuss some of the ways politics has been discussed in recent systemic social 
disorganization and institutional anomie research, highlighting the need for more direct examination of 
how local political dynamics affect crime directly and conditionally.  In addition, I discuss a few recent 
city-level studies that have included direct measures of local politics.  Next, I discuss the impact of city 
politics on political and social outcomes.  Then, I use insights from this research to generate some 
testable hypotheses on the relationship between local politics and crime.   
 
POLITICS IN PREVIOUS CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
As noted above, classic social disorganization theory did not consider the relationship between 
the neighborhood and the larger community context.  Recent research in systemic social disorganization 
theory has begun to address this lacuna.  In particular, recent social disorganization research has 
focused on the role of public control in crime (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; McNulty and Holloway, 
2000; Velez, 2001).  Public control refers to the ability of neighborhoods to secure external resources 
through ties with the local government and police (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993: 17-18).   Thus, systemic 
social disorganization theory predicts that neighborhood crime rates will depend, in part, on the ability 
of neighborhoods to extract resources from the city government.  Consistent with this, Peterson et al. 
(2000) find that certain types of local institutions promote or inhibit violent crime rates in Columbus, 
Ohio neighborhoods.  Not surprisingly, they find that bars have a criminogenic effect.  However, they 
find that local recreation centers have a strong inhibiting effect on violent crime- but only in extremely 
disadvantaged areas.  Peterson et al. (2000) argue that certain local institutions mediate the link between 
disadvantage and violent crime.  Libraries and recreation centers provide greater opportunity for 
interaction among community residents and structure their time—thereby enhancing social control and 
reducing violent crime.  Bars, on the other hand, are expected to increase the opportunity for crime and 
 4 
victimization.  To the extent that communities can increase their local institutional base and fight the 
encroachment of disorganizing institutions such as bars, public control will be enhanced and violent 
crime reduced.   Similarly, McNulty and Holloway (2000) find that the proximity to local public 
housing projects explains much of the race-violent crime relationship in 1990 census block groups in 
Atlanta.  They argue that public housing projects anchor disadvantage and foster crime prone areas 
within the city.  Bursik (1989) finds that the placement of public housing projects in Chicago in the 
1970s occurred in the least stable neighborhoods, which he argues were least able to organize 
politically to block construction.  Thus, public housing is related to crime and the placement of public 
housing depends on local political decisions.  Finally, Velez (2001) —in a 60- neighborhood study 
across three cities—finds that public control reduces the risk of personal victimization and this effect is 
strongest in very disadvantaged neighborhoods.  Even small increases in public control lead to 
reductions in personal victimization risk in very disadvantaged areas, which traditionally have little 
public control.   Because researchers have only recently begun to address mechanisms of public control, 
research has not yet systematically addressed the possibility that variation in local politics could affect 
public control.  However, if public control is about the relationship between neighborhoods and the city 
government, then examining the internal determinants of neighborhood organization only addresses 
half the relationship.  The external political environment is also likely to affect the ability of 
neighborhoods to develop the ties with local government necessary to increase public control and 
reduce crime.  Thus, it makes sense to consider the structures and processes that are likely to affect city 
political responses to community attempts to secure resources.   
Similarly, institutional anomie has begun to address the relationship of politics and crime.  
Institutional anomie theory suggests that the high crime rate in the United States is due to the 
overwhelming strength of economic institutions over non-economic institutions such as the schools, 
churches and the polity (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997a).  In a cross-national study of homicide rates, 
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Messner and Rosenfeld (1997b) find a relationship between political restraint of the market and 
homicide.  Homicide rates were lower in countries where the government protected citizens from the 
“vicissitudes of the market” through welfare programs.   Similarly, Savolainen (2000) finds that the 
effect of inequality on homicide depends on the strength of the welfare state across countries.  
Specifically, the impact of inequality on homicide decreased as the strength of a country’s welfare state 
increased.  Similarly, Chamlin and Cochran (1995), in a state- level test of institutional anomie, found 
that the effect of poverty on property crime decreased as voter turnout increased.  Thus, these studies 
suggest that crime depends on the relative strengths of political and economic institutions.   
These studies point to the critical role of governmental structure in determining crime at the national 
level.  However, to date institutional anomie research has not considered variation in local politics.  If 
variation in local politics affects the ways that governments protect citizens from market forces, then 
one must consider local as well as national politics.  The urban politics research discussed below 
suggests that patterned variation in local politics across cities can have political and social 
consequences that I argue affect crime and the relationship between deprivation and crime.   
In short, both institutional anomie and systemic social disorganization theory suggest the 
importance of examining the relationship between politics and crime but have not adequately 
considered how variation in local politics could affect crime.  To date, only a few studies have 
examined how variation in local politics affects crime.  This is perhaps because of the unit of analysis in 
previous research examining politics.  Although national- level (e.g. Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997b; 
Savolainen, 2000), state- level (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995), and neighborhood- level  (McNulty and 
Holloway, 2000; Velez, 2001) analyses yield important insights, they are not well suited for capturing 
the effects of variation in city-level politics.   
Recently a few studies of crime have included direct measures of variation in local politics.  For 
example Shihadeh and Flynn (1996), suggest that the political strength of groups within the city will 
 6 
have important consequences for crime.  In a study of segregation and black crime rates in 150 large 
cities in 1990, they suggest that, “… [b]lack isolation from whites may also lead to political … 
disenfranchisement of black neighborhoods (Shihadeh and Flynn, 1996: 1332).”   Black social isolation 
may inhibit the ability of communities to procure services from the city government.  This isolation 
inhibits the ability of the community to organize against crime.  The authors suggest that one resource 
communities can have within the city is representation on city councils.  Thus, cities with greater black 
political empowerment should have lower crime because they are able to garner important resources to 
limit the effects of isolation and thereby reduce crime.  Similarly, Rosenfeld et al. (2001) in a study of 
social capital and homicide, include the proportion of the voting age population that voted as a measure 
of civic engagement.  They argue that, “… high levels of civic engagement should strengthen social 
organization, and promote informal social control, thereby yielding lower levels of crime and violence 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2001: 286).”  Thus, areas with high civic engagement should be better able to secure 
external resources such as policing necessary to control crime.  They note that social disorganization, 
strain, and anomie theories suggest the relevance of social capital for reducing crime.  One component 
of social capital—civic engagement—is related to politics.  However, these authors do not account for 
the possibility that aspects of the structure of political systems could affect levels of civic engagement.  
Evidence from political science research suggests that it can.  For instance, research suggests that non-
partisan voting systems depress voter turnout (Alford and Lee, 1968; Karnig and Walter, 1977, 1983).  
Jacobs’ and his colleagues have also included direct measures of local political variation in three recent 
studies of city- level violence.  Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) find that police killings of citizens are lower 
in cities with African- American mayors.  Jacobs and Carmichael (2002) find that citizen killings of 
police and non-lethal assaults against police are less likely in cities with African- American mayors.  
Finally, Jacobs and Wood (1999) find that interracial homicides are affected by the presence of an 
African-American mayor.  They find that whites kill blacks more often in cities with African- American 
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mayors, whereas blacks kill whites less often in cities with African- American mayors.  Thus, aspects 
of local politics clearly have implications for crime. 
The consideration of certain aspects of politics in recent research on systemic social 
disorganization and institutional anomie theories and other recent city-level research discussed above 
represent important first steps in understanding the relationship of politics and crime.  However, more 
work can be done to explain how local politics affects crime.  I argue the best way to do that is to 
examine research on the causes and consequences of variation in local politics.  In the next section, I 
briefly review urban politics research on the consequences of progressive era reforms.           
 
CITY POLITICAL STRUCTURES, REPRESENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 
One dominant theme in studies of urban politics has been the impact of progressive era reforms 
on local politics.1  During the nineteenth century, local government was dominated by patronage 
politics, where city officials traded favors for votes (see Banfield and Wilson, 1963).  In the early 
twentieth century, reformers sought to limit the influence of machine politics by introducing changes in 
local government (Bridges and Kronick, 1999; Knoke, 1982).  This discussion is limited to the three 
most common reforms.  The first was to change form of government from an elected mayor to an 
appointed city manager.2  The second reform was to change electoral systems from district- based city 
council elections to at-large elections where council members were elected to represent the city as a 
whole.  Finally, reformers sought to reduce machine politics by making elections formally non- 
partisan.  Table 1 provides operational definitions of the local political structures discussed.  Because 
the term ‘reform’ has strong normative connotations, it is important to bear in mind that no normative 
preference is suggested in the use of the term in this context.  It is retained here only because it is the 
standard term used in political science literature on the topic.   To reduce the normative baggage 
associated with calling cities with mayor- council forms of government, partisan electoral procedures 
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and geographically- based city council elections ‘unreformed’, I will refer to these as traditional local 
governmental structures in the discussions that follow.  
Table 1 about here 
 
Although the overt goal of reform was to produce governments concerned with the good of the 
entire city, a strong underlying theme was the desire of middle class businessmen to limit the political 
influence of working class, poor, and immigrant groups (Bridges and Kronick, 1999; Hofstadter, 1955).  
In the South, reformism became virtually synonymous with exclusion of blacks from the political 
process.  Indeed, the link between electoral systems and black city council representation was so strong 
that court cases challenged the constitutionality of at-large election procedures (see Bullock and 
MacManus, 1993 for an overview).  In the next section, I discuss research that has examined the effects 
of variation in the three major elements of reformism—form of government, partisanship of elections, 
and city council electoral procedures—on political and social outcomes.   
 
LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND REPRESENTATION 
Urban politics research has extensively examined the effect of various electoral systems on 
black city council representation.  Early research suggested that at-large elections produced lower black 
representation than district elections (see Welch, 1990 for an overview).   In district systems black 
candidates need only appeal to a small group of voter, who are more likely to be of similar race due to 
patterns of residential segregation.  Some evidence suggests that the effect of at-large elections on black 
city council representation has declined in recent years, particularly outside the South (Bullock and 
MacManus, 1993; Sass and Mehay, 1995; Welch, 1990).  However, Sass and Pittman (2000) found that 
the trend toward increasing black representation through the early 1990s stagnated later in the 1990s.   
Extant research also suggests that partisanship of elections can affect the race and socio- 
economic status of city council members (Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Welch and Bledsoe, 1986, 1988).  
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Partisan systems moderately favor the representation of poor and minority groups on city councils 
(Welch and Bledsoe, 1988) because political parties provide an important organizational resource that 
the poor and minorities can use to mobilize voters.  In addition, because voters do not have party cues 
to follow in voting, name recognition becomes much more important in non- partisan elections.  
Therefore, non- partisan elections favor candidates with greater resources to advertise.   Finally, non- 
partisan local elections depress voter turnout (Alford and Lee, 1968; Karnig and Walter, 1977, 1983).  
All these factors moderately favor the election of white, middle and upper- class city council members 
in non-partisan elections.   
Although research suggests that local political structures can affect who is elected to political 
office, it is reasonable to ask whether this has any policy implications.  Many argue that there are good 
reasons to be skeptical about the potential influence of minority representation on local policy outcomes 
because of the need for coalition- building and the economic constraints that many cities face (e.g. 
Karnig and Welch, 1980: 150-152; Santoro, 1995: 795).  Despite these constraints, some research 
suggests that increased black representation in city government could affect the kinds of policies 
implemented (e.g. Browning et al., 1984; Campbell and Feagin, 1975; Cole, 1976; Karnig and Welch, 
1980).  In particular, a large research literature has examined the relationship between local black 
representation and black municipal employment.  Although not unequivocal, evidence suggests that 
increases in black city council and mayoral representation increase black municipal employment (Dye 
and Renick, 1981; Eisinger, 1982), particularly black police employment (Kerr and Mladenka, 1994; 
Salzstein, 1989).      
 
LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND POLICY OUTCOMES 
Another line of research has examined whether structures of local government have any direct 
effect on local public spending (e.g. Liebert, 1974; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978; Morgan 
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and Pelissero, 1980; Morgan and Watson, 1995).  For instance, Lineberry and Fowler (1967) found 
that city taxation and expenditure levels were more responsive to socio-economic and racial cleavages 
in traditional cities, which they argue was because of the necessity of satisfying the local electorate to 
maintain office.  Similarly, Lyons (1978) argues that minority and poor driven calls for increases in city 
services are more likely to be heeded in mayor-council cities, whereas middle and upper class tax- 
paying homeowners will likely drive expenditures down in council- manager or commission cities.  
However, in a widely- cited study, Morgan and Pelissero (1980) found no differences in overall 
spending between reformed and traditional cities.   
More recent studies have suggested that local political structures can affect municipal spending 
patterns but the relationship is conditional.  For instance, Wong (1988) argues that local redistributive 
spending is the type most likely to be affected by organized interest groups within the city and reformed 
local governments reduce the ability of organized groups to affect the political process.  Thus, reformed 
governments might not affect city expenditures for road construction but could reduce the 
responsiveness of the government to pressure for increases in public welfare spending.  Similarly, 
Sharp (1991) finds that the link between local economic distress and economic development policy 
depends on the level of responsiveness of the city government, which in turn, depends (in part) on 
whether the government is reformed or not.  Finally, Langbein, et al. (1996) argue that the effect of city 
council election procedures on spending will depend on whether the proposed expenditure benefits the 
whole city or only certain areas.  They argue that cities with geographic city- council representation 
automatically represent the preferences of geographically concentrated groups better than at- large 
cities.  Therefore, district cities will be more likely to favor spending where the benefit is 
geographically concentrated, whereas at- large cities will favor spending on programs benefiting the 
whole city.   
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Finally, a few studies have examined the effect of reformism on the policy preferences of 
local officials.  For example, Hansen (1975) found that the level of agreement between local officials 
and voters on local issue priorities depended on the competitiveness of local elections and citizen 
political participation, which in turn depended partly on partisanship of elections.  Similarly, Shumaker 
and Getter (1983) found that city elites are most likely to respond favorably to advantaged groups in the 
city.  However, party competition and a strong democratic party—which are less likely to be found in 
reformed cities—reduced the responsiveness bias favoring advantaged groups.    
In sum, evidence suggests that the three major components of progressive era reform—form of 
government, partisanship, and city council electoral rules—can have political and social implications.  
Urban politics research suggests that traditional local governmental structures somewhat enhance the 
election of the poor and blacks to city councils, which, in turn, can affect public policies.  In addition, 
these structures of local government can directly affect spending patterns, economic development 
policies, the distribution of services within a city, and the responsiveness of local governments to the 
poor and minorities.  Although criminological research has only recently begun to address the impact of 
various local political structures on crime, prior research has suggested a number of ways that local 
politics may have consequences for crime.  In the next section I develop some testable hypotheses on 
the relationship between local politics and crime. 
  
LOCAL POLITICS AND CRIME 
FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
City form of government is one source of local institutional political variation that has been 
posited to have criminal justice implications.  Wilson and Boland (1978) find that police in council-
manager cities are more aggressive than in mayor-council cities, as indicated by the number of traffic 
citations written.  They argue that the police departments in commission and city manager governments 
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are more insulated from politics than in cities with elected mayors.  Because elected mayors must 
satisfy the local electorate to maintain office, citizens are likely to have more leverage in trying to 
impact the policies of the police than in cities with managers appointed by the city council or 
commission governments which have no individual head of government to hold accountable.  Thus, to 
the extent that city governmental form inhibits responsiveness of the police to citizen pressure, one 
would expect less positive relationships with the police.  Jacobs and Wood (1999) and Jacobs and 
Carmichael (2002) suggest that interracial violence is higher in cities where black political efficacy is 
lower.  If form of government affects the responsiveness of the police to minority groups, then one 
would expect decreased feelings of political efficacy and increased crime in city manager and 
commission cities.  
In addition, because mayors must be re-elected, they must be concerned with the potential 
swing vote that organized groups represent.  City managers and commissioners are likely to feel less 
pressure to respond to ‘squeaky wheels’ within parts of the city, since they are concerned with the city 
as a whole.  Consistent with this, Lyons (1978) argues that minority and poor driven calls for increases 
in city services are more likely to be heeded in mayor-council cities.  Therefore, on average one would 
expect that mayors would be more attentive to pressure from citizen groups to provide the services that 
poor and minority areas need, which Velez (2001) suggests leads to increased public control and lower 
crime.  As a consequence, ceteris paribus, crime rates should be lower in mayor/council cities.  
Therefore, my first hypothesis is: Cities with mayor/council structures will have lower crime rates than 
those with council/manager or commission governments. 
 
CITY COUNCIL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
Another source of local political variation likely to affect the ties between citizens and local 
officials is structure of the local electoral system.  As noted above, the weight of the evidence suggests 
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that physical representation of poor and minority groups is greatest in cities with geographically- 
oriented electoral systems (Sass and Pittman, 2000; Welch, 1990; Welch and Bledsoe, 1988; Zax, 
1990).  Although the link between increased physical representation of minorities on city councils and 
minority policy representation is not unambiguous, there is clear evidence that district council members 
consider their own district their highest priority, whereas at-large council members see the whole city as 
their constituency (Welch and Bledsoe 1988).  No research that I am aware of compares crime across 
different city council electoral schemes. However, Rose and Clear (1998) suggest that the political 
organization of a community may be a critical factor in community organization against crime and local 
political participation is more likely to the extent that community residents believe that participation 
will produce results.  Bledsoe (1986) found that district- based elections were associated with higher 
political efficacy for blacks.  In other words, blacks are more likely to feel they have a say in local 
government in cities with district- based elections than at- large elections.  Recall that Jacobs and Wood 
(1999) suggest that black political efficacy reduces violence against whites.  Therefore, to the extent 
that district systems enhance the responsiveness of city council members to district- based concerns and 
increase the political efficacy of minority groups, one would expect crime to be lower in district than at-
large cities.   
Another reason for this may be the way that city resources are allocated.  If, as Wong (1988) 
suggests, organized interest groups affect redistributive spending within the city, then city political 
structures that maximize local interest group organization should produce the most redistributive 
spending.  Because district cities represent the preferences of geographically concentrated groups better 
than at- large cities (Langbein et al., 1996), one might expect more redistributive spending in district 
cities than at-large cities, ceteris paribus.  Recent research suggests that redistributive spending is 
directly related to crime.  For instance, DeFronzo (1997) found that AFDC payments per recipient were 
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directly negatively related with homicide.  Thus, my second hypothesis is: Cities with district-based 
electoral systems will have lower crime rates than cities with at-large elections elections. 
 
PARTISANSHIP OF ELECTIONS 
As discussed above, extant research suggests that partisan systems favor somewhat greater 
physical representation of poor and minority city council candidates  (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988) and 
increase voter turnout (Alford and Lee, 1968; Karnig and Walter, 1977, 1983).  Research also suggests 
that partisanship enhances the responsiveness of local officials to citizen concerns (Hansen, 1975; 
Shumaker and Getter, 1983).  Thus, one would expect that partisan elections should enhance the ability 
of citizen groups to cement ties to local public officials and secure public resources, which previous 
research suggests will be tied to reductions in crime (e.g. Velez 2001).  If partisan elections enhance the 
ties of the local community with elected officials and increase the ability of communities to obtain the 
resources needed for public control, one would expect partisan cities to have lower crime rates, ceteris 
paribus.  Thus, my third hypothesis is: Cities with partisan elections will have lower crime rates.   
Throughout the preceding discussion of the effects of local governmental structure, I argued 
that certain political structures enhance the responsiveness of the local government.  It stands to reason 
that if these traditional local institutional structures can enhance governmental responsiveness 
individually and reduce crime, they could also have a cumulative effect.  It seems plausible that crime 
will be reduced as the number of these unreformed or traditional city governmental structures increases.  
Thus, my fourth hypothesis is: As the number of traditional local political structures increases crime 





INTERACTION OF LOCAL POLITICS, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CRIME 
Extant research suggests considerable empirical support for the relationship between social 
structural factors such as poverty and family disruption, and crime (e.g. Land et al., 1990; Miethe et al., 
1991; Parker and McCall, 1999; Sampson, 1985, 1987).  There are a number of plausible explanations 
for this link.  For instance, systemic social disorganization theory suggests that social structural factors 
such as poverty and family disruption lead to a breakdown in community social control, which leads to 
crime (Bursik, 1988, 2000; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993).  However, Rose and Clear (1998) argue that 
not all poor communities are disorganized.  They suggest that the political organization of a community 
may be a critical factor in community organization against crime.  They point to the existence of well-
developed internal political institutions as key factors affecting the ability of the community to address 
problems that arise.  This suggests that political organization could provide a buffer against the 
criminogenic effects of structural factors such as poverty and family disruption.   
The urban politics research discussed above suggests that there may be structural reasons why 
some poor and minority communities may be more able to affect the political process than others.  For 
instance, Lyons (1978) argues that mayor-council governments are more responsive to organized poor 
and minority group pressure because of the swing vote these groups represent.  This variation in 
responsiveness to poor and minority groups is likely to have important consequences for the structural 
factors previously associated with social disorganization and institutional anomie, such as poverty and 
family disruption.  Thus, in mayor- council governments, citizen pressure on local officials may 
produce needed resources in the community to reduce the effects of poverty or limit family disruption.  
Recall that Velez (2001) found that increases in public control reduces victimization most in the most 
disadvantaged communities.   If Lyons (1978) is correct then poor communities in mayor-council cities 
will be better able to secure needed resources for public control and reduce crime.   Therefore, local 
form of government is likely to affect the relationship between deprivation and crime rates.  Thus, my 
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fifth hypothesis is: The effect of deprivation on crime rates will be lower in cities with Mayor/council 
forms of government.   
Institutional anomie theory suggests that the crime producing effects of economic conditions 
depends on the strength of non- economic institutions.  Research at both the national and state level has 
found that the effect of the economy on crime depends on political factors.  Recall that Savolainen 
(2000) finds that the effect of inequality on homicide depends on the strength of the welfare state. 
Similarly, at the state- level, Chamlin and Cochran (1995) found that the effect of poverty on crime 
depended on voter turnout.  Thus, previous institutional anomie research at the national and state level 
suggests that the effect of the economy on crime is conditioned by politics.  However, research to date 
has not examined the interaction of social structure, local politics and crime.     
As noted above, research suggests that cities with partisan elections, elected mayors, and 
district- based city councils will be more responsive to the needs of poor and minority groups (e.g. 
Hansen, 1975; Shumaker and Getter, 1983).  It also seems plausible that the increased responsiveness in 
these traditional political structures could affect the relationship between structural deprivation and 
crime.   For instance, recall Wong’s (1988) assertion that redistributive spending will be more likely in 
district cities and DeFronzo’s (1997) finding that welfare payments per capita were directly related to 
homicide.  If district cities are more generous with welfare payments then one can expect them to have 
lower violent crime than at-large cities.  As a consequence, these cities will be more likely to institute 
programs to reduce the impact of poverty and unemployment, and as a consequence have lower crime 
rates.  Likewise, previous research suggests that voter turnout is higher in partisan cities.  Because, 
previous research has shown a relationship between voter turnout, poverty, and crime at the state- level, 
it seems worthwhile to examine whether the same relationship inheres at the local level. As noted 
above, institutional anomie research suggests a national- level link interaction between the economy, 
politics and crime.  The research discussed here suggests that this may translate to the city level as well.  
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Thus, my sixth hypothesis is: As the number of traditional local political structures increases, the 
effect of deprivation on crime will decrease. 
RACE OF LOCAL OFFICIALS 
 To this point, the discussion has focused on characteristics of local political structure.  The 
urban politics research, discussed above, also examined the effect of actors within the system.  As 
noted above, although some research questions their potential influence (Karnig and Welch, 1980: 150-
152; Santoro, 1995: 795), some evidence suggests that minority local officials can affect local policies  
(e.g. Browning et al., 1984; Campbell and Feagin, 1975; Karnig and Welch, 1980).  For instance, 
Browning et al. (1984) found that black city council representation was associated with civilian police 
review boards and other research suggests that black representation increases black police employment 
(Dye and Renick, 1981; Kerr and Mladenka, 1994; Salzstein, 1989).  A few previous studies have 
suggested direct connections between minority representation and crime.   
For instance, Shihadeh and Flynn (1996) suggest that the political strength of groups within the 
city will have important consequences for crime.  They argue that black social isolation may also lead 
to political exclusion of black neighborhoods.   In particular, they examine the level of black 
representation on city councils.  To quantify black political empowerment within cities, Shihadeh and 
Flynn (1996) measure of black city council representation equity, which is the proportion of city 
council members that are black, divided by the proportion of city’s voting age population that is black.  
Values less than one indicate that the black community is politically underrepresented and values equal 
to or greater than one suggest that the black community is politically empowered.  Thus, cities with 
greater black political empowerment should have lower crime because they are able to garner important 
resources to limit the effects of isolation and thereby reduce crime.  Although Shihadeh and Flynn 
(1996) did not find consistent effects of black political empowerment on black violence, it is worth 
considering whether other measures of local minority political strength matter for crime.  It seems 
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plausible that absolute black political empowerment could be more important than relative equity of 
council representation.  For example, according to their equity measure, a city with a 5% black 
population would be over-represented on a city council if 1 council member out of 10 were black. 
However, an absolute measure would predict the power of that single black council member to affect 
policy to be small.  Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine different measures of black political 
empowerment on city council to determine if there are differences in crime rates.  Thus, my seventh 
hypothesis is: Crime rates will be lower in cities with higher black city council representation.   
Studies have also suggested that the race of the mayor can have direct criminal justice 
consequences as well.  For instance, Salzstein (1989) finds that cities with black mayors have higher 
black police employment and are more likely to institute civilian review boards for police.  One would 
expect that increased minority involvement in the police force and the institution of civilian review 
boards would enhance the quality of the relationship between the minority community and the police.  
Research by Jacobs and his colleagues suggests that the race of the mayor has direct implications for 
crime.  They find that minority killings by police (Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998) and both lethal and non-
lethal violence against police (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002) are less likely in cities with African- 
American mayors.  Jacobs and Carmichael (2002) suggest that the link between the race of the mayor 
and crime may be due to the perception of injustice by minorities.  They suggest that some crimes result 
from feelings of injustice and that this sense of injustice leads to lashing out against the perceived 
majority—the most visible agents of which are the police.  The presence of a black mayor reduces these 
feelings of injustice and increases feelings of political efficacy (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990).  Therefore, it 
is reasonable to expect that the presence of a black mayor may reduce black feelings of injustice and 
lead to more positive relationships between the minority community and the police, ultimately reducing 




 In sum, recent city- level studies have suggested that politics may play a role in crime.  Urban 
politics research suggests that local politics can affect the responsiveness of the city government to 
organized groups within the city and policy outcomes.  I argue that this variation in governmental 
responsiveness will affect crime rates.  The research discussed above suggests that the structures and 
processes of local government can affect policies of the police and crime.  Although it is important not 
to overstate the policy differences that result from differences in local politics, Velez (2001) suggests 
that even small differences in public resources can reduce victimization in very poor neighborhoods.  In 
the next section, I discuss the data and methods used to test the hypotheses discussed above.   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
To assess the hypotheses discussed above, I selected the 1071 cities with 25,000 or more 
residents in 1990 listed in the County and City Databook, 1994 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000).  
Missing data reduced the sample size by about 10% to 958.  However, other than having a slightly 
larger mean population (104,000 v. 88,000), the missing cases do not appear to affect the demographic 
characteristics of the sample. The dependent variable is measured in 1991, and predictor variables are 
measured in 1990 (unless otherwise noted) so that the temporal ordering of measured variables would 
correspond to the implied causal ordering of arguments.  The details of variable construction are 
discussed below.  
 
MEASURES 
The current study measures crime using the crimes known to the police from the Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR) (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2000) because it is the only crime measure available for a 
sufficient number of cities to provide variation in local political structures and is considered a 
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reasonably accurate reflection of serious crime (Gove et al., 1985; LaFree, 1998).  Following other 
recent studies (McNulty and Holloway, 2000; Peterson et al., 2000; Velez, 2001), I examine violent 
crime, which includes murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, in 1991. 
All city institutional political variables were obtained from the 1991 Form of Government 
(FOG) survey conducted by the International County/ City Management Association (Urban Data 
Service, 1992) (see Appendix A for questionnaire items). 4  For the analyses reported below, I created a 
categorical variable indicating city form of government called mayor- council, coded 1 for cities with 
mayor/ council governments and 0 for council- manager and commission cities.5  City council electoral 
procedures were captured in the at-large variable.   At-large, is coded 1 if all city council members are 
nominated and elected to serve the whole city, and 0 otherwise.  Thus, the excluded reference category 
includes cities where at least some members of the council are elected to represent geographic areas 
within the city.  Partisan is coded 1 if the political party affiliation of candidates appears on the ballot 
in local general elections, and 0 otherwise.  Finally, to capture the cumulative effects of these local 
political structures, I create a variable, traditional government structure index, where 1 is added to the 
index for each unreformed local political structure (mayor-council, district or mixed, and partisan).  
Therefore, this variable ranges from 0-3. Unfortunately, information on local political structures was 
missing for a number of cities in the sample.  To reduce the number of missing cases and the possibility 
that reporting errors on the FOG survey impact the analyses, the 1981, 1986 and 1996 FOG surveys 
(Urban Data Service, 1982, 1987, 1997) were examined.  Where there was consistency in a political 
structure before and after 1991, that value was substituted for the missing 1991 value.  Where any 
ambiguity remained, calls were placed to each mayor or city clerk’s office to verify the political 
structures in 1991, whether missing or seemingly the result of reporting error on the FOG survey. 
In addition, the race of city officials was available in the FOG survey for 722 cities in the 
sample.  Therefore, I created a categorical variable named black mayor, coded 1 if the city’s mayor was 
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African- American in 1991, and 0 otherwise.   I also created two measures of black city council 
representation.  Black city council proportion is the number of black city council members divided by 
the total number of city council members.   
Previous research has also identified a number of social structural factors that are related to 
crime such as poverty, family disruption, (Land et al., 1990).  However, in preliminary OLS analyses 
using separate social structural factors, variance inflation factors (VIF) exceeded 10, indicating severe 
multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1996).  Therefore, following previous research (e.g. Land et al., 1990; 
Parker and McCall, 1999), I created an index, which I call deprivation.  Principal components analyses 
produced a factor with the following indicators: percent poor in 1989, percent unemployed in 1991, 
percent of owner- occupied homes in 1990, and percent of female- headed households in 1990.  Factor 
loadings for all variables were quite high –  .72 to .91.  I generated factor scores for each city based on 
the 4 variables listed above.  Following social disorganization theory, the percentage of the city’s 
population that was foreign born in 1990 is included separately as a measure of ethnic heterogeneity.  In 
addition, the percentage of the city’s population that is black and the percentage that is Hispanic are 
also included as separate independent variables (both natural logged to reduce skewness).6  Including 
the deprivation index in analogous OLS regression equations substantially reduced maximum VIFs 
(less than 4.0 in all reported results), suggesting that multicollinearity did not affect reported results.   
Population density and percent population change have also been linked to crime in prior 
research (see Land et al., 1990).  Therefore, percent population change (from 1980 – 1992) and 
population density (rate of 1992 population per square mile are included in reported analyses.  Also, 
prior research on the distribution of crime across the life course suggests that crime commission rises 
through the teen years, then, declines from the early twenties on (see Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990 for 
a review).  Failure to control for the size of the youthful population could mean that differences in crime 
across cities could be due to variation in the size of the most crime- prone population.  Therefore, the 
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natural log of the percentage of population age 18 to 24 in 1990 is included.  Another variable 
included in many previous city- level analyses of crime is regional location (e.g. Parker and McCall, 
1999; Shihadeh and Flynn, 1996).  South is a categorical variable coded 1 for cities in southern states 
(AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC, VA, and TX) and 0 otherwise.  Few previous city-level 
studies of crime have included any measure of local finances.  However, one major tool city 
governments have to deal with local problems is through expenditures.  It seems plausible that cities 
that spend more on their citizens will have lower crime rates.  For instance, DeFronzo (1997) found that 
AFDC payments per recipient were significantly negatively related to homicide in 141 cities.  
Unfortunately welfare expenditures were not available for a sufficient number of cities in the sample.  
Therefore, the impact of overall city expenditures per resident will be assessed.  This variable is 
measured as city expenditures (in dollars) per resident in the 1990- 1991 fiscal year.7  Because reported 
crime could be a function of policing levels (see Levitt 1998), I also include a measure of police 
spending, which is the city expenditures for policing per resident (in hundreds of dollars) in the 1990- 
1991 fiscal year.  Finally, to address potential unobserved heterogeneity, the natural log of violent 
crimes in 1990 is included in all reported models.8  This provides a stringent test for explanatory 
variables in the model because prior violent crime explains a large proportion of the variance in the 
dependent variable (Morenoff, et al. 2001).  See Appendix B for means and standard deviations and 
Appendix C for bivariate correlations of variables used in the analyses.   
 
STATISTICAL MODELS 
Preliminary analyses showed that the dependent variable is highly skewed.  This is probably 
due to the large range in the size of cities included in the sample.  The smallest cities in the sample had 
only 25,000 residents whereas the largest cities had more than 1 million residents.  Although previous 
research has often dealt with this issue through log transformation of the dependent variable, Osgood 
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(2000) shows the superiority of Poisson- based models for aggregate crime rate data.  Transforming 
Poisson regression of counts into the rate data of interest in the current study is accomplished by 
including the natural log of the population in 1991 in the linear model and fixing the coefficient to 1, 
following standard practice in discussions of Poisson- based analyses (see Gardner et al., 1995; Osgood, 
2000; Osgood and Chambers, 2000).  The Poisson model also assumes that the linear model adequately 
explains the variation in violent crime across cities.  In essence, the Poisson model assumes that there is 
no residual dispersion left to explain, once the explanatory variables are included in the model.  The 
negative binomial models reported in Table 2 avoid this unrealistic assumption by including an 
estimated dispersion parameter to account for residual variance.9 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results of four negative binomial regression equations predicting the rate of 
violent index crimes per 100,000 residents in 1991.  Equation 1 includes several variables suggested by 
prior research to be related to crime.  To assess overall model fit, one can use a likelihood ratio test, 
which is computed as twice the difference between the log- likelihoods of the models being compared.  
This value is then compared to the χ2 distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in 
the number of parameters between the two models being compared (Osgood and Chambers, 2000).  In 
this case, one is comparing equation 1 to a model with only a dispersion parameter and an intercept.  
The χ2 value = 1491.4 which is highly significant (p < .0001), suggesting that the model fits the data 
very well. 
Turning to the effects of individual variables, as expected, violent crime in the previous year is 
strongly positively associated with violent crime in the current year in all equations in Table 2 (p < 
.0001).  Also, (as shown in the deprivation index) structural factors such as: female- headed households, 
poverty, unemployment are highly significantly positively associated with crime rates (p < .0001).  In 
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the negative binomial model, the beta coefficient refers to the proportional change in the dependent 
variable when the independent variable changes by one unit (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).  Therefore, 
one would expect violent crime to be 26% higher for each unit increase in the deprivation index—
which is approximately a standard deviation because this is an index.  Both the natural log of the 
percent of the population that is black and the natural log of the percent of the population that is 
Hispanic are highly significantly related to the natural log of violent crime rates in 1991 (p < .0001), net 
of the other factors in the model.  Thus, violent crime increases as the percentage of African- 
Americans and Hispanics in the population increases.  However, percent foreign born, percent 
population change, and population density are not significantly related to violent crime rates in 1991, 
net of prior crime and the other factors in the model.  Percent of the population age 18-24 is strongly 
negatively related to violent crime in all reported results, net of the other factors in the model.  It is 
possible that the individual link between age and crime does not translate to higher levels of 
aggregation.  In other words, it could be that younger cities have aggregate crime- reducing effects that 
run counter to the individual relationship between age and crime.  Cities located in southern states have 
significantly higher violent crime rates than cities in non-southern states, even controlling for the other 
factors in equation 1 (p < .05).  Contrary to expectations, police spending is actually significantly 
positively related to crime (p < .0001).   This could be because the variables are measured 
contemporaneously, but it is unlikely that current violent crime rates affect current police spending 
because local budgets take time to develop.  As predicted, overall city expenditures are significantly 
negatively related to violent crime rates (p < .0001) across all models reported in Table 2.  Thus, 
controlling for the other factors in the model, cities with higher expenditures per resident have lower 
violent crime rates.  It appears that, when it comes to violent crime, cities get what they pay for.   
Table 2 About Here 
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Equation 2 adds the local political structural variables discussed above.  Contrary to 
hypothesis 1, mayor- council cities do not have significantly lower violent crime rates than council- 
manager and commission cities (p = .1534), controlling for the other factors in the model (although the 
coefficient is in the expected direction).  Consistent with hypothesis 2, city council electoral procedures 
appear to be significantly related to crime.  Cities with purely at- large council elections have 
significantly higher violent crime rates (p <  .01) than cities where some or all of the council members 
are elected to represent geographic districts within the city.  Thus, net of prior crime and the other 
factors in the model, one would expect violent crime to be 8.3% (℮.080) higher in purely at-large cities 
than those with some form of geographically based city council representation.  Contrary to hypothesis 
3, partisan cities did not have significantly lower violent crime rates than nonpartisan cities, controlling 
for the other factors in the model, although the variable did approach significance (p = .105) and was in 
the predicted direction.   
Consistent with hypothesis 5, the effect of social factors such as poverty, unemployment and 
family disruption on violent crime depends on the local form of government.  The significant negative 
value (p < .01) for the interaction term between the deprivation index and mayor- council means that 
the structural factors included in the index have less of an impact on violent crime in mayor- council 
cities, controlling for prior violent crime and the other factors in the model.  To illustrate this, consider 
the differences in predicted violent crime rates by form of government.  Because the mayor-council 
variable has a value of 0 in council- manager and commission cities, the interaction term drops out of 
the prediction equation for those cities.  Thus, the effect of structural deprivation on violent crime rates 
in council- manager and commission cities is the main effect for the deprivation index.  In mayor-
council cities, the addition of the coefficient for the interaction term (-.096) reduces the effect of 
structural indicators of deprivation on violent crime rates by 31% (.096 / .309) over council- manager 
and commission cities, controlling for the other factors in the model.10  It is also interesting to note that 
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the effect of the southern region variable drops to non- significance once the political structural 
variables are included in the model.  Thus, some of the regional differences in crime between southern 
and non-southern states found in previous studies could have been due to the failure to control for local 
politics. 
Equation 3 substitutes the traditional government structures index to capture the cumulative 
effects of mayor-council forms of government, partisan elections, and district- based city council 
representation.  The traditional government structures index is significantly negatively related to violent 
crime (p< .0001), controlling for the other factors in the model.  Thus, consistent with hypothesis 4, as 
the number of traditional local political structures increases violent crime decreases.  Equation 4 also 
includes the interaction between traditional government structures index and the deprivation index.  
Consistent with hypothesis 6, the coefficient for this interaction term is negative and significant (p < 
.05).  Substantively this means that the effect of poverty, unemployment, marital disruption, and 
homeownership on violent crime weakens as the number of representation enhancing local political 
structures increases.   
 
RACE OF LOCAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND CITY VIOLENT CRIME RATES 
In addition to the effect of local political structures on physical representation of blacks, the 
research discussed above suggests that the race of officials occupying local governmental positions may 
also affect local policies and crime.  Consistent with Jacobs’ recent research (Jacobs and Carmichael, 
(2002; Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998) and Shihadeh and Flynn (1996), I 
hypothesized that black local officials would enhance the ties of poor, minority residents to the local 
government, which, in turn, should reduce violent crime. Equation 4 includes the black city council 
proportion variable and the categorical variable for whether the mayor is black, following hypotheses 7 
and 8.11  As noted above, race of mayor and city council member information was only available for 
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722 cities in the sample.  However, the results from equation 4 are substantively similar to equation 
3, suggesting that the model is not sensitive to the sample.  Contrary to hypothesis 7, the proportion of 
the city council that is black is not significantly related to crime.  Equation 4 also includes a 
dichotomous measure of the race of the mayor, coded 1 if the city’s mayor was black, and 0 otherwise.  
Consistent with hypothesis 8, having a black mayor is significantly related to violent crime.  Thus, net 
of prior violent crime, local political structures and the other factors in the model, one would expect 
violent crime to be 20.6% (℮.187) lower in cities with an African- American mayor. 12 
 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the current study considered the effect of variation in local political arrangements on 
violent crime rates across cities.  This study found that local politics had direct and conditional effects 
on violent crime.  Specifically, the study found that violent crime rates were lower in cities where at 
least some city council members are elected to serve geographic districts.  Thus, there appears to be 
something about district- based city council representation that reduces violent crime.  The urban 
politics research discussed above suggests that this may be because district- based political 
representation enhances the responsiveness of local governments, which may in turn, lead to policies 
that reduce violent crime.  Likewise, violent crime went down as the number of unreformed or what I 
termed traditional local political structures increased.  This offers more evidence for the notion that 
certain local political arrangements enhance or inhibit the accessibility of local officials in ways that 
help reduce crime.  In addition, the effects of structural indicators of deprivation, such as poverty and 
family disruption, on violent crime were lower in cities with mayor- council forms of government and 
as the number of traditional local governmental structures increased.  Thus, there appears to be 
something about certain local governmental structures that weaken the relationship between deprivation 
and crime.  The study also found that, controlling for prior violent crime, local political structures and 
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the other factors in the model, cities with African- American mayors had lower violent crime rates.  
This is consistent with previous research showing that the race of the mayor can affect crime (e.g. 
Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002; Jacobs and Wood, 1999). 
These results have implications for systemic social disorganization and institutional anomie 
theories.  Systemic social disorganization theory suggests that political organization may be a source of 
community social control that helps reduce crime.  Likewise, institutional anomie theory suggests that 
the effect of the economy on crime depends on the strength of political institutions.  However, neither 
perspective has considered the possibility that there may be patterned variation in local politics that 
could affect crime.  The urban politics research discussed above and the results of the current study 
suggest that both institutional anomie and systemic social disorganization perspectives could profit 
from examination of how the direct and conditional effects of local politics on violent crime.   
Recent research from the institutional anomie perspective has begun to consider the direct and 
conditional effects of politics on crime.  For example, Savolainen (2000) found that cross-national 
variation in homicide rates depended in part on the strength of the welfare state.  Likewise, Chamlin 
and Cochran (1995) found that the relationship between economic conditions and crime depended on 
the strength of non-economic institutions.  The current study showed that local political variation 
affects violent crime and the relationship between economic conditions and crime.  Therefore, future 
research on institutional anomie needs to further specify the dimensions of non-economic institutions 
and how these affect crime directly and the relationship between economic institutions and crime.   
This study also has implications for research from the systemic social disorganization 
perspective.  As noted above, recent research in social disorganization has focused on public control, 
which refers to the ability of neighborhoods to secure external resources through ties with the local 
government and police (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993).   Thus, systemic social disorganization theory 
predicts that neighborhood crime rates will depend, in part, on the ability of neighborhoods to extract 
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resources from the city government.  However, these studies focus nearly exclusively on the internal 
aspects of public control.  The results of the current study suggest that future research on public control 
needs to focus on the external aspects of this relationship and examine the role local governmental 
structure plays in constraining or enabling local community organization and the responsiveness to 
community demands for services.   
Similarly, some have recently begun to argue that politics has an impact on parochial levels of 
control as well.  Recent work by Sampson and Morenoff and their colleagues (Morenoff et al., 2001; 
Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999) suggests that collective efficacy is one 
important source of local community control that mediates the effect of social structural disadvantage 
on crime.  Similarly, Rosenfeld et al. (2001) include voter turnout as one indicator of civic engagement 
in their measure of social capital.  However, no criminological studies have addressed the possibility 
that local political variation could systematically affect parochial control.  The urban politics literature 
suggests some good reasons to believe that local politics is likely to have patterned effects on parochial 
control as well.  For instance, as noted above, non-partisan elections depress voter turnout—one of 
Rosenfeld et al.’s, (2001) measures of civic engagement.  Likewise, Bledsoe (1986) found that district 
elections were associated with higher political efficacy for blacks.  In other words, blacks are more 
likely to feel they have a say in local government in cities with district- based elections than at large 
elections.  Thus, how local politics affects parochial control should be addressed in the future as well.   
This study also has wider implications for criminology.  It suggests the value of considering 
how local politics structures the relationships between citizens, the local government, and the police.  
For instance, given recent attention to community policing (e.g. Skogan and Hartnett, 1997), it seems 
reasonable to wonder whether local political structures affect the likelihood of implementation and 
success of community policing programs.  Research suggests that the adoption of community policing 
programs often occurs as the result of community pressure (Zhao, 1996).  If reformed local 
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governments make elites less tuned to the priorities of the citizens, reformed governments could be 
less likely to implement community policing or develop and maintain the relationships with poor 
communities to make it successful. Finally, segregation is an important issue in both studies of race and 
crime (Peterson and Krivo, 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn, 1996) and black city council representation 
(Vedlitz and Johnson, 1982).  Future studies will examine the joint impacts of race, residential 
segregation, and local politics on violent crime.  
It is important to recognize the limitations of the current study.  First, the urban politics studies 
discussed here do not predict dramatic differences across cities based on variation in local political 
structures.  However, Velez (2001) argues that in high crime areas even small increases in external 
resources can reduce victimization rates.  Thus, even if the differences between reformed and 
unreformed governments are not dramatic, they may be enough to have an impact on violent crime.  
Second, the current study employed relatively crude measures of politics due to limited data 
availability.  Thus, these measures can only serve as proxies for responsiveness.  Future studies will 
need to find measures that are better able to directly measure the responsiveness of local governments 
and the effect of this responsiveness on crime.  For instance, data on variation in the policy outputs of 
various local governments such as community block grants or welfare spending would provide a better 
picture as to the mechanisms through which local politics affects crime.  In addition, future studies will 
need to examine how party politics affects the outcomes discussed here.  For instance, given the 
Republican focus on law and order in recent years (e.g. Jacobs and Helms, 1996), it is reasonable to 
wonder whether the party of local officials affects crime.    
In sum, criminological studies have only recently begun to consider the impact of local political 
structural variation on violent crime.  Historians of urban politics have suggested that one of the goals 
of reform was to reduce the political clout of the poor and minorities.  The empirical studies discussed 
above suggest that there are some lingering differences in the way local governments respond to citizen 
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pressure based on differences in local governmental structure. The results of the current study 
suggest that this affects city- level variation in violent crime.  The importance of local political 
structures for violent crime in the current study also suggests the value of expanding on traditional 
explanations of crime by applying insights from research outside mainstream criminology.     
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NOTES 
1. For overviews of the history of progressive era reforms see Banfield and Wilson, 1963; Fox, 1977; 
Griffith, 1974; Hofstadter, 1955). 
2. Council-manager cities have mayors but they are usually selected from among city council members 
rather than being directly elected and do note drive policy as they do in mayor-council cities.  
3. It is important to keep in mind that these unreformed governmental structures are posited to lead to 
responsiveness rather than being direct indicators of governmental responsiveness. 
4. This raises potential causal order issues.  However, it is quite unlikely that the current crime rate will 
be an important factor in cities changing their form of government.    
5. Only 11 cities in the sample had commission governments.  It is also possible to have town meeting 
and representational town meeting forms of government but no cities in the sample had either form.   
6. Alternative models that included percent black in the deprivation index produced similar results.  
7. This again raises the issue of causal order.  However, because city budgets take time to develop, 
current city expenditures are more likely to influence crime rates than the reverse. 
8. For an example see Table 5 of Sampson and Raudenbush (1999).  
9. The advantage of including this parameter in the model is that when there is no overdispersion in the 
model, the parameter estimate is 0 and the negative binomial model reduces to the Poisson model. 
10. I also tested to see if region interacted with the political effects discussed here.  No significant 
interactions between local politics and region were found.   
11. Previous research in urban politics limited samples to cities with 5% or 10% black populations 
assuming that blacks must make up a sufficient proportion of the electorate to obtain the threshold of 
support necessary for election (e.g. Karnig, 1979; Karnig and Welch, 1982; Welch, 1990).  This appears 
to be unduly restrictive because 26 cities with less than 5% black populations and 61 cities with less 
than 10% black populations in the current sample had black city council members. 
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12. An alternative model substituting Shihadeh and Flynn’s (1996) black city council population ratio 
produced similar results.  In addition, although the correlation between percent black and the black city 
council proportion is quite high (.83), alternative models that reduced the potential for multi-collinearity 
by including percent black in the deprivation index yielded similar results.  Finally, models that 
included black mayor, black city council proportion or ratio variables separately produced substantively 
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Table 1.  Local Political Structures 
CITY FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
Mayor/ Council    head of government is elected 
 
Council/ City Manager  head of government is appointed professional administrator 
 
Commission  group of elected officials collectively govern 
 
ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
District  council members elected based on geographical area within city 
 
At-large   all council members elected by whole city 
 
Mixed  some council members elected at large and others by district 
 
PARTISANSHIP 
Partisan        local or national political party appears on the ballot in general election 
 




Table 2.  Negative Binomial Regression of City Violent Crime on Social Structure, Local  
Political Structures and Race of Elected Officials 





































































































Local Political Structures     
   Mayor/ Council  -0.0453 
(0.0317) 
  
   Partisan  -0.0606 
(0.0374) 
  










   Traditional Govt. Structures Index 
 




   Deprivation*Traditional   
   Govt. Structures Index 




Black Elected Officials     
    Black Council Proportion 
 
   -0.1010 
(0.1777) 
    Black Mayor  
 
   -0.1871* 
(0.0864) 
N      958      958      958      722 
Log- Likelihood 10661091.4 10661105.5 10661103.2 5165258.9 
Likelihood Ratio χ2a 1491.4**** 28.2*** 23.6*** 4.63+ 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses,  + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, **** p <.0001 (2-tailed 
tests).  
a χ2  in equation 1 refers to LR comparison with intercept only model, χ2  in equations 2 and 3 refer to LR  
comparison with equation 1, χ2  in equation 4 refers to LR comparison with equation 3 model with N of 722.  
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Appendix A. Summary Of ICMA FOG Survey Questions Used  





Question 1: Indicate your current form of government as defined by your charter, ordinance, or state 
law.  
 1. Mayor/ Council 
 2. Council/ Manager 
 3. Commission 
 4. Town Meeting 




Question 29: Indicate the number of council members selected by each of the following methods? 
1. Nominated and elected at large 
2. Nominated by ward or district and elected at large 
3. Nominated by ward or district and elected by ward or district 
4. Other 




Question 21: Does the political party affiliation of candidates for board or council appear on the 
ballot in a local general election?   
 1. No 2. Yes 
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Appendix B.  Univariate Statistics for Variables Reported in Table 2. 
      
 N Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
      
Violent Crime 91 958 796.11 691.84 2.33 4301.0 
 





































      
Police Exp/ Resident 958 11.68 5.29 3.28 75.16 
 




958 11.99 15.31 0.08 89.95 
Percent Hispanic 
 
958 10.42 15.15 0.20 93.9 
Deprivation Index 
 




958 57.79 12.54 21.63 91.54 


























      
Pct. Population 
Change 
958 23.38 47.13 -23.20 587.70 
      
Pct. Foreign Born 
 
958 9.26 9.78 0.20 70.40 




0.081 0.13 0 .75 
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Appendix C. Bivariate Correlation Matrix*  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Violent  
Crime 91 
1.00          
2. Violent 
 Crime 90 
.94* 1.00         
3. Population  
 
.26* .25* 1.00        
4. Population 
Density   
.21* .23* .24* 1.00       
5. % 18-24 
 
-.02 -.02 -.01 .02 1.00      
6. Police 
Expenditures 
.39* .41 .19* .27* -.10 1.00     
7.Expend/ 
Capita 
.24* .25* .27* .15* -.01 .49* 1.00    
8. Percent Black .66* .67* .15* .08* .04 .23* .22* 1.00   
9. Percent 
Hispanic 
.22* .22* .09* .41* -.02 .13* -.06* -.11* 1.00  
10. Depriv. 
Index 
.66* .65* .17* .25* .32* .17* .23* .63* .25* 1.00 
 
11. % Own- Occ. 
Homes 
-.4* -.39* -.16* -.38* -.51* -.25* -.31* -.31* -.23* -.73* 




.56* .56* .12* .19* .1* .05 .10* .5* .33* .87* 
 
14. Pct Female 
Head House.  
.72* .71* .18* .25* .11* .27* .33* .8* .07* .9* 
 
15. % Pop. 
Chg 
-.15* -.13* -.05 .17* -.09* -.11* -.12* -.20* .12* -.28* 
 
16. % Foreign 
Born 




.13* .11* .14* -.01 .06 -.07* .15* .30* -.27* .25* 
18. Black City 
Council Prop. 
.57* .59* .17* .07 .07 .17* .20* .83* -.08* .54* 
 
19. Black Mayor .39* .4* .26* .17* .05 .2* .17* .40* .05 .32* 
 
           
* p < .05 (two-tailed test), N= 958 for all variables except Black City Council Proportion and Black 
Mayor (N= 722).  
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Appendix C. Bivariate Correlation Matrix continued* 




1.00         
12. Percent Poor -.57* 1.00        
13. Percent 
Unemployed 
-.42* .79* 1.00       
14. Pct Female 
Head House.  
-.57* .74* .72* 1.00      
15. % Pop. 
Change 
.17* -.23* -.20* -.33* 1.00     
16. % Foreign 
Born 
-.25* -.02 .09* -.03 .04 1.00    
17. Traditional 
Govt. Index 
-.12* .19* .19* .34* -.3* -.29* 1.00   
18. Black City 
Council Prop. 
-.28* .45* .43* .66* -.25* -.11* .26* 1.00  
19. Black Mayor -.17* .21* .28* .39* -.05 .03 .04 .46* 1.00   
* p < .05 (two-tailed test), N= 958 for all variables except Black City Council Proportion and  
Black Mayor (N= 722). 
